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The Information Revolution and the Direction of Governance
From: RAND
| By:
John Godges |
EDITOR'S INTRODUCTION |
Twenty years from now, by the year 2020, the information revolution will have altered life on this planet dramatically, but global networks, such as the Internet, defy clear government jurisdiction. In this article, edited by John Godges of the RAND Review, RAND researchers explore three models of governance whose flexible, transnational and decentralized character fit the demands of the information age. |
 everal US government agencies have asked RAND to take the lead in broadly outlining what may lie ahead and boldly deducing the implications for government and society. The work has proceeded on three fronts: (1) to chart the future course of the information revolution throughout the world over the next 10-20 years; (2) to identify potential forms of global governance that might become necessary as a result; and (3) to suggest a national "information strategy" appropriate for a global information age. |
To identify forms of global governance that might be necessary for the information age, Francis Fukuyama and Caroline Wagner highlighted three models of political and social organization that could complement the nation-state: distributed decisionmaking, citizen councils, and nongovernmental organizations. These models function not as hierarchical systems of control; rather, they involve broader swaths of the body politic in transnational deliberations. |
The direction of governance
Of particular concern to the US government, naturally, is how to govern the new technologies--or, in other words, how to control, direct, shape, or regulate their use. In an age of globally networked information systems that could be used for good or ill by any user, it is not yet clear what kinds of governmental decision-making structures should or could be put into place. Whereas the industrial revolution generated large-scale technologies (telecommunications, airlines, nuclear energy) whose control required centralized decisionmaking by national authorities, the information revolution has produced global technologies whose control resides largely in the hands of individuals. The obstacles to governing such technologies are tremendous. |
In fairness, Fukuyama and Wagner recognize that the new technologies have been hailed for supporting the political values championed by the West. Cheap and ubiquitous phones, fax machines, radios, computers, e-mail, and the Internet have all been saluted for helping to overthrow authoritarian powers throughout the world and spread liberal democracy. Modern communications were crucial in undermining the communist states of East Germany and the Soviet Union as well as the right-wing dictatorship of Ferdinand Marcos in the Philippines. In the future, the information revolution could help to open other closed societies such as China, whose government has tried to control Internet use for political reasons. |
Americans also have selfish reasons for wanting to spread the revolution around the world with few constraints. Americans stand to benefit economically. American companies dominate the global information industry. American media and cultural products, from CNN to Disney to MTV, will be disseminated via the new technological innovations. American media will also foster American values, both political and cultural, as the world becomes more electronically connected. It is natural for Americans to argue for minimal government regulation of information technologies, for that would appear to favor American interests and values around the world. |
But the Internet poses real problems for America as well. The Internet has evolved well beyond its original function of sharing information into a global commercial trading system. Electronic commerce has strained international trade agreements, jurisdictional powers over taxation and regulation, and legal safeguards for intellectual property. The borderless nature of electronic commerce has also extended the reach of criminal activity. Money launderers, drug traffickers, hate groups, and pornographers rank among the most innovative users. Terrorists have new tools, too. Not only can terrorists organize across international borders, they can also undermine social order by spreading false or misleading information that may be difficult to counteract. |
In fact, the Internet could accelerate the fragmentation of civil society itself. In the middle of the 20th century, the mass media gave Americans a common set of cultural experiences, whether through watching the Ed Sullivan Show or reading Life magazine. All forms of media today, not just the Internet, target highly specialized niche markets, with 500 cable channels on television and tens of thousands of online discussion groups on the Internet. In aggregate, citizens have fewer and fewer common cultural experiences and points of reference, with possible negative implications for their ability to associate and work together as a national political community. |
The solution might be to build an international political community, according to Fukuyama and Wagner. They do not propose some kind of world government that would weaken US sovereignty. They do, however, recognize that no single nation can govern the new technologies. To control, shape, and regulate them will require institutions as borderless and decentralized as the technologies themselves. Therefore, the researchers propose that the US government work with other governments, organizations, and individuals to create new institutions of governance, as opposed to government. These institutions will need "buy-in" from a wide range of nations, organizations, and average citizens to be considered legitimate and effective. When technology is in the hands of individuals, the only viable regulatory structure will be one endorsed by those individuals themselves. |
New governance mechanisms are needed quickly, Fukuyama and Wagner argue. They weigh the possibilities for three existing models of governance: distributed decisionmaking, citizen councils, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). All three models have the ingredients of future success: They are nimble, inclusive, decentralized, and global. All three models also have disadvantages. |
The first model, decentralized decisionmaking, would require many organizations and users to reach consensus on various matters: what technologies to support with research and development money; what technologies need governance; what the norms of use and application should be; and whether, how, and at what level of formality the technologies should be regulated. Although this process of creating common norms would provide a solid foundation for global governance, it often takes a long time to create common norms. And time, unfortunately, is of the essence. |
The second approach would be to create citizen councils that would make recommendations to formal governing bodies. For instance, hundreds of citizen councils could be organized across the United States (or around the world) and encouraged to deliberate over the rules and regulations that should govern information technology. Using the formidable networking capacities of the Internet, these councils could share ideas on a series of questions and point toward a governing consensus. A centrally organized group--such as the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy, the National Science Foundation, or a public-private coalition--could provide the considerable incentive of coordinated action, could give the councils sufficient information with which to deliberate, and could serve as the clearinghouse for opinions and ideas. Citizen councils like this have been used quite effectively in Europe. However, American culture is less homogeneous than the culture of many a European nation. Citizen councils in America would have to represent the greater diversity of the American people as well as simultaneously accommodate the individualistic nature of US culture. |
The third approach would be to promote governance of information technologies by international NGOs. In recent years, numerous NGOs have used electronic communications to achieve outcomes otherwise unattainable by sovereign nation-states. Human rights and other activist groups forced the hand of the Mexican government on behalf of the Indians in Chiapas. Greenpeace and other environmental groups forced Shell Oil to change its policies with respect to the North Sea and Nigeria. Other groups induced the sportswear maker Nike to promise compliance with child labor standards. In each case, NGOs changed the behavior either of a government or of a large multinational corporation when state action had been ineffective. NGOs have the capacity to organize quickly and transnationally in ways that avoid the bureaucracy and rigidity of conventional international institutions. |
On the other hand, NGOs are ultimately unaccountable to anyone but their own adherents. Unlike a democratically elected legislature that can be turned out of office, NGOs cannot be removed by popular demand. They lack the legitimacy of formal government institutions that operate by popular consent. Moreover, NGOs usually deal with limited issues in limited ways. NGOs have neither the obligation nor the capability to promote the public interest at large. |
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