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UK Policy Towards the Jews in 1938
From: Cambridge University Press
| By:
Louise London |
EDITOR'S INTRODUCTION |
What was the British response to the plight of European Jewry under Nazism? Why did so many Jews seek refuge in America, rather than shifting to nearer European countries? Louise London, a lecturer at Royal Holloway and University College, London, suggests that British self-interest consistently limited its humanitarian aid to the Jewish people of Europe. In this feature she shows how detailed legislation and the individual personalities of Whitehall worked to achieve a balance between the strong immigration laws and humanitarian concerns of 1938. |
 n 1938 the Nazi regime launched a terrifying new onslaught against Jews in the Reich. It began with a move timed to anticipate the imminent statelessness of Polish Jews in Germany. The Polish government, in order to exclude Jews who had been living abroad, had acted to withdraw their citizenship. Three days before this measure was due to take effect, the Germans suddenly rounded up some 10,000 Polish Jews and expelled them en masse to the frontier with Poland. There, border guards barred the way forward and the Germans the way back. Unable to proceed into Poland, the Jews were forced to remain in inhuman conditions in a no man's land on Polish soil at a place called Zbonszyn. Some people died, others lost their reason. The fate of the survivors remained uncertain. It took many weeks before most were admitted to Poland. Meanwhile a seventeen-year-old Polish Jew named Herschel Grynszpan, then living in France, learned that his parents had been caught up in the expulsions. He himself was under threat of expulsion from France. The distraught youth called at the German Embassy in Paris and fired a pistol at a third secretary, wounding him fatally. |
The assassination was denounced in Germany with menacing threats against Jews and wild allegations that British politicians were implicated. Fearful that a pogrom was imminent, Germany's Jewish leaders sent an eleventh-hour plea, delivered by no less a messenger than Weizmann, asking the British government to select 'some prominent non-Jewish Englishman to go to Berlin immediately' to try to prevent it. But officials in London and Berlin agreed that such action would, if anything, make matters worse for Jews in Germany and that to meddle in 'a wasps' nest' could only detract from British prestige. |
The murder was the pretext for an outburst of violence against Jews which erupted simultaneously throughout Germany and Austria on the night of 9 November. Authorised by Hitler and orchestrated by the German authorities, the pogrom became known as Kristallnacht, because so much glass was smashed in attacks on Jewish homes and businesses. Details of the ill-treatment of Jews filled many telegrams from the British chargé d'affaires in Berlin, George Ogilvie-Forbes, and consular officials. From Vienna, Gainer reported waves of arrests of Jewish men attempting to visit the British consulate. Official instructions for measures against the Jews issued by Reinhard Heydrich, head of the SS (Schutzstaffel), stated that Jews ordered to be arrested and taken to concentration camps should not be ill-treated. The German government later denied that Jews had been harmed. However, reports of violence against thousands of Jews told a different story. The Germans murdered nearly 100 Jews. Many others were driven to suicide. About 30,000 male Jews were taken to concentration camps. A certain number were later released, so Ogilvie-Forbes reported, if they could prove that they were 'in a position to leave the country forthwith'. The new wave of persecution was, he observed, 'on a scale and of a severity unprecedented in modern times'. |
Within hours, the head of the Foreign Office's Central Department, William Strang, was convinced that the pogrom in Berlin had been planned by the German authorities. This remained the Foreign Office view. The distribution of culpability within the German leadership was less clear. Makins saw no reason to disbelieve a report that Goering and the Ministry of Economics wished for milder policies towards the Jews and to negotiate with the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees (IGC), but had acquiesced in violence for which Goebbels was responsible. Ogilvie-Forbes considered that the pogrom had been 'instigated and ordered' by the German government and that recent events had 'only accelerated the process of elimination of the Jews which has for long been planned'. The measures of official punishment meted out to the Jews of Germany in the aftermath of the violence included a fine of 13 million marks for destruction and damage which they were alleged to have provoked. Ogilvie-Forbes thought the proceeds of the fine should be used to assist Jewish emigration. |
Reports of the onslaught against the Jews led to outraged protests in Britain. The prime minister told the Commons that the government would be 'taking into consideration any possible way by which we can assist these people'. On 14 November a meeting of the Cabinet Committee on Foreign Policy convened by the foreign secretary, Halifax, discussed the worsening state of Anglo-German relations since Munich and the possibility of war. The question of whether to make any specific response to Germany's persecution of the Jews was raised by the home secretary, Hoare. He said that 'unless something was done there were signs that the House of Commons and the country might get out of hand'. Hoare's only suggestion concerned the USA, whose German immigration quota was fully earmarked for the next five years and could not be increased without legislation. He thought it might be possible to arrange to surrender part of the undersubscribed British annual quota of 60,000--of which only about a quarter was used--in aid of German Jewish immigration. The meeting rejected several other ideas. Chamberlain dismissed proposals of putting pressure on Germany to modify its harsh internal policies. He saw little public demand for the government to act in this way and emphasised that Britain was 'not in a position to frighten Germany'. However, he wished to respond to the 'very general and strong desire that something effective should be done to alleviate the terrible fate of the Jews in Germany. Some such action, taken in collaboration with America, would ease the public conscience.' Hoare appeared to feel that all Britain needed to do was to get the United States to act, perhaps through the quota transfer he had suggested. He said it was not true that the USA was admitting many Jewish refugees while Britain was 'doing nothing': |
A powerful and responsible Jewish organisation in London was dealing with individual cases at a cost of £5,000 a week and about 75 refugees were being daily admitted to this country. The organisation was anxious that these figures should not be disclosed as they would be criticised both by those who would think them inadequate and by those who would regard them as excessive.
The discussion showed that some action was felt to be necessary but there was no clear idea of what it should be. Halifax worried over arousing anti-Jewish prejudice. Oliver Stanley thought pressing the United States for a quota transfer would be a mistake unless Britain was taking 'some comparable action to admit German Jews into the United Kingdom'. It was said that Winston Churchill thought British policy should assist the Jews--he favoured settlement in some colony such as British Guiana. Chamberlain was sceptical. Opening up an undeveloped tropical country was, he said, 'a long and very expensive business'. The settlement of 250,000 Jews in British Guiana had been proposed, 'but it was quite clear that under the most favourable conditions the settlement of anything like this number must take a very long time'. Chamberlain thought the dominions contained the most suitable places for settlement of European Jews within the empire. The discussion ended with no resolution. |
The following day Chamberlain received a deputation of Anglo-Jewish leaders led by Viscount Samuel. He was accompanied by the chief rabbi, Dr J. H. Hertz, Viscount Bearsted, Lionel de Rothschild, Neville Laski and Chaim Weizmann. The Jewish leaders estimated that 500,000 Jews remained in Germany, of whom 300,000 might emigrate if given the opportunity. They asked Chamberlain to facilitate the urgent temporary admission of children and young people aged up to seventeen years for education and training, with a view to ultimate reemigration. Jewish organisations in Britain would give a new collective guarantee in support of the young people's entry and would take full responsibility. The deputation announced that the Council for German Jewry (CGJ) had launched an immediate appeal for funds, which for the first time would be directed to non-Jews. Samuel pressed for the authorisation of extra staff to deal with the emergency and reduce the 'extreme congestion' in administering refugee casework. Chamberlain expressed deep concern and sympathy, but made no firm promises. He suggested that Samuel take up the question of extra staff with the departments concerned, promising his 'benevolent interest'. Entry to Palestine was the subject of a separate request by Weizmann. He sought the eventual admission of 6,000 young men then in German concentration camps, who might go to refugee camps in the Netherlands in the interim; he also asked for the immediate evacuation to Palestine of 1,500 children. Chamberlain promised to consider this sympathetically if the colonial secretary raised it with him. The next day, Chamberlain's office circulated the record of the meeting, asking departments whose responsibilities were principally affected to consider points coming within their province. |
On 16 November, the full Cabinet discussed 'The Jewish Problem'. Ministers were conscious of the pressure to take some action in response to Germany's persecution of the Jews. Halifax claimed that the view that the government was not doing enough was damaging Britain's reputation, especially in the USA. He suggested that:
the position could be restored if this country would give a lead which would force the United States in turn to take some positive action. He hoped that it might be possible on the course of the next day or so for us to lend our support to fairly wide promises of help to the Jews.
Ministers discussed making land in the empire available for Jewish settlement. Halifax expected political gains to flow from such a gesture. But the colonial secretary warned against exaggerating the limited possibilities in the mainly agricultural colonies. Chamberlain contrasted the numbers who might benefit from temporary refuge in a colony with the smaller numbers who might be admitted for settlement. All agreed it desirable to make an offer of some territory. Most hope was placed on British Guiana, despite the limited possibilities it offered. The offer did not need to be unconditional--Chamberlain suggested retaining a measure of control by means of a long lease at a nominal rent. But by the close of their discussion of the settlement issue ministers were no nearer to being able to offer large-scale admissions to any colony in the foreseeable future. |
Still, Chamberlain had, for the second time in two days, made ministerial colleagues face the fact that any proposed colonial settlement was unable to meet the immediate need for large-scale refuge. He next turned to the question of short-term refuge, saying that this had been the particular concern of the deputation of Jews the previous day. In response to his indication that the government would take some action on colonial settlement they had pointed out:
that time was the essence of the matter. It followed that anything which we could do in regard to a permanent settlement must also be accompanied by some effort to find a temporary resting-place for refugees while arrangements were made for their permanent reception.
The two ministers most concerned with refugee questions showed no enthusiasm for making Britain such a resting-place. Winterton fended off American criticisms of British inaction. Certain countries in South America would act, he thought, 'if we could show them a good example'. But he insisted that no large-scale emigration could be effected unless IGC efforts succeeded in enabling Jews to take money out of Germany. Hoare advocated action in British colonies as the way to influence opinion and loosen purse-strings in the United States, and ultimately open the door into the country, which he saw as 'the key to the problem'. Entry to Britain, Hoare said, was the subject of 1,000 letters a day, but 'only cases which were recommended by the Jewish representatives were admitted'. Jewish representatives opposed large-scale admissions or the entry of Jews they had not approved, he said, 'since they were afraid of an anti-Jew agitation in this country'. They also feared the consequences of publishing admission figures. The meeting agreed that such a step was risky, yet wished to get credit for what Britain was doing, and so Hoare eventually agreed to consider communicating a figure privately to the Americans. |
Makins had warned Chamberlain that it was very doubtful that the Home Office would welcome an increase in the number of Jewish immigrants. Certainly Hoare opposed a more generous entry policy. According to the minutes, Hoare said:
that we were going as far at present as public opinion would allow, and it was important to retain a check on individual immigrants. He thought, however, that we might agree to admit a number of young Jews for the purpose of agricultural training, with a view to their ultimate settlement elsewhere. He was also in favour of admitting a number of Jewish maidservants. These girls might replace the German domestics who had left at the time of the [Munich] crisis.
This was nothing new. Hoare was merely setting out existing policy. The only categories of Jews whose admission Hoare proposed were already being allowed in. Even before the Evian conference it had been Home Office policy to admit agricultural trainees and domestic servants. The availability of job opportunities had been the only brake on numbers. On the procedural side, Hoare was merely re-affirming the need for preselection. His overall position was opposed to an expansion of admissions--a stance he claimed had the backing of both public opinion and Jewish representatives. |
Hoare cited the fears of Jewish refugee organisations but Chamberlain countered by pointing to the pressure for more open admissions from the high-ranking Jewish deputation he had seen the previous day. He ended by suggesting that, 'if, in addition to offering a territory overseas, we undertook to allow Jews to come here as a temporary refuge this would constitute a considerable contribution towards the problem'. According to the minutes, Hoare 'undertook to consider this point'. Several of the other ministers gave signs of realising that the climate had changed and that a more generous approach to admissions had gained the upper hand. Suddenly, Hoare showed concern about the plight of the elderly, saying that the Jewish refugee organisation was not attempting to deal with older people but concentrating on the younger generation. Halifax joined in, floating the idea of asking people to sponsor individual elderly Jews 'who would otherwise be left to an appalling fate in Germany'. |
The meeting finally agreed that a statement outlining proposed action would be drafted by the ministers whose responsibilities were most affected and issued speedily. The next day Hoare announced in the Commons that the Home Office was expanding the numbers of staff dealing with applications for entry by refugees and that everything possible would be done to eliminate delays, though these were largely due to difficulties in obtaining necessary information about applicants' cases. |
On the afternoon of 21 November the prime minister made a Commons statement. It was largely devoted to an enumeration of the steps the government was taking to survey the possibilities of settlement in the colonial empire, especially plans to lease large areas of British Guiana. On further admissions to the United Kingdom, Chamberlain merely reiterated that numbers were 'limited by the capacity of the voluntary organisations dealing with the refugee problem to undertake the responsibility for selecting, receiving and maintaining' refugees. He stated that since 1933 the government had permitted about 11,000 refugees to land, in addition to some 4,000 to 5,000 who had since reemigrated. He dismissed as 'premature' the suggestion by Eleanor Rathbone MP of a loan for refugee maintenance. Other questioners were told to await the home secretary's speech that evening. Chamberlain's statement was widely reported in the North American press. Hoare's speech would arouse much less interest abroad since it concerned domestic policy only. |
Hoare set out the government's new approach later the same day during a Commons debate on refugee policy. The need for careful selection was his starting point. He warned that mass immigration was likely to encourage the growth of fascism, although he did not use the word. He also stressed the importance of preventing 'an influx of the undesirable behind the cloak of refugee immigration'. The government therefore needed to check in detail the individual circumstances of adult refugees, a process bound to involve 'a measure of delay'. Individual cases would be investigated by voluntary organisations represented on the Co-ordinating Committee, whose recommendations the Home Office accepted. The main issue was whether refugees could support themselves. The 11,000 German refugees who had come to live in Britain in the years 1933 to 1938 had set up industries which provided jobs for 15,000 British workmen; they had thus improved rather than damaged British employment prospects. These benefits, Hoare claimed, were due to 'very careful selection'. In reality the creation of most of these jobs dated from the period prior to the revival of mandatory pre-selection. |
Hoare admitted that the admissions system had been strained 'to breaking point' in the preceding ten days, but, with thousands of applications per day, strain was inevitable. The machinery was now being greatly expanded, he announced. Moreover, while the Home Office would stick to individual selection for persons who might stay permanently, selection procedures would be modified for people coming for temporary refuge, for whom a less detailed scrutiny was permissible. Those expected to re-emigrate were 'a class of case which we can deal with en masse', he said, and could be admitted on an unprecedented scale and more speedily. Transmigrants would be provided with a temporary home, on the understanding that, 'at some time in the future, they will go elsewhere for their permanent home'. The government would also look kindly on proposals for training for eventual resettlement in the colonial empire, such as an existing scheme to train 'Jewish boys for agriculture and Jewish girls for domestic service'. Large numbers of 'non-Aryan children' could be admitted without the individual checks used for older refugees, provided they could find responsible sponsors. All children whose maintenance could be guaranteed could come. Jewish parents would accept separation from their children to save them from danger in Germany. Hoare commended to his fellow countrymen this 'chance of taking the young generation of a great people'. He asserted the government's anxiety to help, promised 'the utmost support' for the voluntary organisations' work and vowed to show 'that we will be in the forefront among the nations of the world in giving relief to these suffering people'. |
Chamberlain and Hoare represented the two major positions on government action. Chamberlain's contributions to the ministerial discussion on 14 November showed his belief that Britain should act and his insistence on the distinction between long-term settlement prospects and immediate action. In the Cabinet meeting of 16 November Chamberlain steadfastly supported urgent action to provide temporary refuge. He insisted on the distinction between the immediate need for temporary refuge and long-term projects of permanent settlement overseas, emphasising the limited scope and uncertainty of settlement prospects in the colonies. The IGC's shortcomings were obvious and Chamberlain had seen warnings from Makins, the expert on the IGC, to the effect that the possibility of any useful contribution from that quarter looked more dubious than ever. Chamberlain did not fall into the error of viewing the IGC's programme as a substitute for immediate action, nor were his views altered by Hoare's arguments. Such obduracy seems to have been a characteristic of the prime minister. The historian Ian Colvin could discover no example, in two and a half years of Cabinet meetings, in which Cabinet discussion had altered his mind on a subject. |
How do we explain the position which Chamberlain took on the refugee issue? Chamberlain had previously demonstrated his sympathy for the Jewish plight. After the Anschluss the celebrated violinist, Fritz Kreisler, an Austrian of partly Jewish origins, saw Chamberlain, an old personal friend, and enlisted his support in obtaining a German passport so that he could return to Germany. Chamberlain's meeting on 15 November with Jewish leaders--the most distinguished deputation Anglo-Jewry had yet mustered on refugees--clearly impressed him. Colvin says that Chamberlain was known to alter his mind between Cabinets. Yet perhaps he did not so much change his mind on the immigration of refugee Jews--an issue in which he had so far shown little interest--as think hard about it, possibly for the first time. |
Chamberlain's letters to his sisters show that the Kristallnacht pogrom horrified him. Still, his primary concern was with the questions it raised about his Anglo-German policy and his own dilemma over balancing his public comments on the recent events. He wrote to his sister Ida: |
I am horrified by the German behaviour to the Jews. There does seem to be some fatality about Anglo-German relations which invariably blocks every effort to improve them. I suppose I shall have to say something on the subject tomorrow as there will certainly be a private notice question & it will be [? problem] how to avoid condonation on the one side or on the other such criticism as may bring even worse things on the heads of those unhappy victims. It is clear that Nazi hatred will stick at nothing to find a pretext for their barbarities.
The difficulty of making progress with Hitler was a continuing and major worry. In mid-December Chamberlain deplored the 'continued venomous attacks by the German press, and the failure of Hitler to make the slightest gesture of friendliness'. He felt that discussions on any subject with Germany were impossible for the time being. However, he maintained an interest in discreet informal contacts with various German intermediaries. |
Months after the pogrom, Chamberlain was still trying to make sense of it. Writing to his sister Hilda, he essayed an analysis of German anti-Jewish persecution which revealed something of his own attitude to Jews. Hilda had sent him material showing that some Jews were still being given posts in Germany. Chamberlain replied: |
Your enclosure from Mrs Sichel is very interesting. I had no idea that Jews were still allowed to work or join such organisations as the Hitler Youth in Germany. It shows, doesn't it, how much sincerity there is in the talk of racial purity. I believe that the persecution arose out of two motives, a desire to rob the Jews of their money and a jealousy of their superior cleverness. No doubt Jews arent [sic] a lovable people; I don't care about them myself; but that is not sufficient to explain the pogrom.
He then turned to speculating about Hitler's sanity, wondering if his moods were characteristic of a 'paranoid' but aware that they were not proof of any organic disease. |
Chamberlain's reactions show his practical nature. He tended to respond to events by trying to decide on his next step. He could not dwell on an issue for long without exploring its implications for him personally. Thus his concern with Anglo-German relations shaped his response to the persecution of the Jews. He was not averse to showing the Germans that their policies were isolating them, but he wished to develop good relations with amenable elements in Germany. He was prepared to show distaste for anti-Jewish persecution. For example, in the winter of 1938-9 he told the Deutsche Shakespeare Genossenschaft that his real reason for refusing an honorary presidency the society wished to confer on him was that it had expelled its Jewish members. But he felt impelled to state his own ambiguous feeling about this 'unlovable people'. |
After his forced resignation as prime minister in 1940, Chamberlain, now lord president of the Council, expressed concern in Cabinet over the handling of internment. He was sensitive about being chairman of a committee which decided to deport alien internees, and intervened in the deportation of two Jewish refugee boys to Canada, apparently helping to keep one in the United Kingdom. |
Chamberlain has received insufficient credit for his contribution to easing refugee admissions. On the other hand, excessive credit for the generous side of British policy has gone to Hoare. This is partly because, as home secretary, Hoare presided over the admission of Jewish refugees, and did so sympathetically. It is also because his failure to argue for a more open policy--indeed his opposition to it--in Cabinet discussions remained hidden in records which were not released for many years. As home secretary, Hoare was obliged to act and speak on refugees, but he carried out both decisions which were forced on him and decisions he supported. His remarks during the months following the decision to expand temporary refuge display his worry about the accumulation of refugee Jews in the United Kingdom and his preoccupation with searching for other places to send them. |
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